Statistical inference often depends on the estimation of a model where errors are uncorrelated with the variable being predicted. If the model is hypothesized to represent a system in nature, then the errors are usually assumed to be the result of randomness or other exogenous processes. Relaxing both of these notions can lead to an alternative approach to estimation and prediction. In this approach, a pool of models that perfectly fit existing data is used for meta-prediction of future outcomes. * daltman@stern.nyu.edu. I thank Richard Freeman for opening my mind to alternative forms of modeling and Gary Chamberlain for imbuing a humble approach to data. Andrew Gelman offered cursory comments on an early version of these ideas, which was published in October 2016 on medium.com. I thank Francisco Pérez-González for his useful comments.
Introduction
Though I wasn't always the best student, I received a thorough and traditional training in econometrics during my undergraduate and graduate work in economics. Lately, however, I have come to question some of its assumptions. In particular, I have worked in areas where using several models to evaluate the same complex system may yield better predictions than trying to refine a single model that may not truly represent the system.
In particular, my work has led me to consider uncertainty in the choice of models more carefully. This uncertainty -rather than uncertainty about outcomes of a system -can become the basis for an alternative approach to inference. Others have written about model uncertainty at length, both in the use of technology to postulate and assess models en masse (e.g. Clyde and George, 2004) and the modeling of the uncertainty itself (e.g. Onatski and Williams, 2003) . The concept may deserve greater consideration in mainsteam economics, however, hence this brief paper. I hope the proposal of an alternative methodology will at least supply grounds for further discussion.
The alternative approach
Agnosticism. Let us imagine that we are trying to model a system, but we have very little information about it. For example, in an election, we may know ex ante who is eligible to vote and ex post the outcomes, but we may be relatively ignorant of why people choose to vote and who they will vote for. We may hypothesize many models of voting -an infinite number, in fact -but we do not know which one truly represents the actual workings of the system. Our task is to collect contenders for the true model and use them to make a meta-prediction for the system.
No randomness. The true model will predict the outcomes of every election with no errors. Here we relax the assumption of randomness, and instead assume that every process bearing on the election's outcomes can be modeled. This new assumption may well be appropriate for elections, since their outcomes can be built on millions of votes; the notion that randomness could change the outcomes seems a little farfetched.
Narrowing the pool I: perfect fit. With this definition of the true model, it is
easy to rule out some of the models we might hypothesize. During any period when the system being modeled has not changed, the true model should perfectly fit the outcomes. We are left with a subset of models that have perfectly predicted the system in the data we have to date.
Narrowing the pool II: No proxies. We may further narrow our pool of models by rejecting those that rely on proxies or second-hand information about the workings of the system. In our example of an election, the results of polls are unlikely to be the actual drivers of the system; rather, they are only a reflection of what potential voters may be thinking before the election. By contrast, more fundamental factors that affect the likelihood of voting or a vote itself -such as weather and transportation, or income and religion -could be part of the true model. *
Inference. The pool of models now contains only those based on fundamental factors that have also fit the system perfectly in the past. In the absence of priors about the workings of the system, any of these remaining models is equally likely to be the true model. Therefore, the predictions of each model for the future outcomes of the system should receive equal weight in any forecast we might create. If we are able to collect ten models of an election, and four of them predict Candidate A will win, then we may say that Candidate A's chance of winning is 40 percent.
Dynamic prediction.
With each recorded outcome of the system, we may be able to narrow the pool of models further. If the system has not changed -at least in a way we can discern -then we can reject any model that failed to predict the most recent outcome. In this way, the pool of models becomes more focused with each outcome.
Refinements
Efficiency. In collecting models for the pool, we may encounter one model whose predictors are a subset of the predictors in another model. If the pool has already been narrowed to include only models that perfectly fit prior data, then the second model may be rejected. In terms of efficiency, it is dominated by the first
Problems
Completeness. This new approach places an enormous onus on the researcher to collect as many models as possible for the initial pool. The researcher has no way of knowing whether the pool is a sufficiently representative (or complete) sample of all possible models to be predictive.
Time limits.
A complete sample will not necessarily make the correct prediction for the next outcome of the system, but, in the limit, successive culls would leave only the true model. If the system does not operate long enough to reach this limit, then the pool may be less predictive.
Spurious models. Over some period of time -even an infinite period -an exogenous process may perfectly predict the outcomes of the system, even though the process has no relationship with the system. In fact, even a representative or complete pool may harbor more spurious models than legitimate models, if enough modelers share similar misconceptions. A researcher may decide to give zero weight to models suspected of being spurious, with the caveats expressed above.
Final thoughts
The idea of polling a diverse group of models on a single question is not alien to scientists in many disciplines outside economics. Though the collection of these models may appear to involve several arbitrary decisions, these decisions don't seem any more arbitrary than the choice of a single specification to model a system. This is especially true when there may be several omitted variables stemming from unknown underlying processes. For systems like elections, whose dynamics are so poorly understood that a nation full of experts can be wrong about their outcomes, this alternative, agnostic approach may yield better predictions.
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